I. INTRODUCTION
WATER AUTHORITY OF JORDAN
The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) was created as a national government agency
by Law n°18/1988 entrusted with the provision of water and wastewater services
and the management of water resources.
Responsibilities include the monitoring of water sources, regulating groundwater
use and providing water supply and sewerage services for the entire Kingdom.
The Authority has a board of directors consisting of related government representatives
and one private representative. The Board is chaired by the Minister of Water
& Irrigation. The executive manager of the Authority is the Secretary General.
Upon its establishment, WAJ inherited the functions of the municipalities
as well as Central Government with respect to bulk and retail supply of water,
and wastewater services. Network, facilities, treatment plants, staff, and debts
were all transferred to WAJ. The Authority was set up as an autonomous corporate
body with financial and administrative independence. In reality, however, civil
service constraints were imposed, government procurement by laws were followed,
and all activities were scrutinised by the Central Audit Bureau and the Bureau
for the Supervision and Inspection.
Regarding domestic services, the country is divided into 12 n° administrative
governorates, each as an individual Water Authority. Each governorate was also
set up as an autonomous unit but, due to the rigidity of laws and bylaws, ended
up centrally managed, budgeted, staffed, and so on.
AMMAN GOVERNORATE WATER DIRECTORATE
This paper focuses on Amman Governorate and its water and wastewater activities.
The focus emanates from the urgent need to select the path to follow in resolving
problems within the Governorate in particular and the Water Sector at large.
Greater Amman is highly urban covering approximately 530 km² out of which
only 170 km² are built-up and 220 km² are classified as Zoned Land,
i.e. area which is open for different types of use like residential, commercial
and industrial according to the " Planning and Building Law ".
By law, the Water Authority is obliged to provide zoned areas with water services.
WATER RESOURCES AND SUPPLY TO AMMAN ARE CHARACTERIZED BY THE FOLLOWING :
2 - DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM
TECHNICAL SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
As expected, the rapid population growth, and the widely scattered settlement
areas were beyond any planning capabilities for infrastructure development.
WAJ was obliged to follow this development by expanding its services in a " wild
growth " pattern. The initially installed production and transport
facilities were expanded and cross - linked to the extent that initially reasonable
hydraulic conditions became inadequate.
This loss of control caused the assessment of unaccounted - for- water on
a global basis basically covering the entire Greater Amman rather that evaluation
of individual areas. Therefore, selection of a particular area for rehabilitation
over another (i.e. prioritizing) is not supported by hard facts.
Demand exceeds the supply throughout the year. Water shortage is acute in
the summer period during which all production and pumping facilities are fed
directly into the system with excessive pressures over wide areas. Also during
the summer, water is rationed thus leaving pipes empty for certain periods.
Networks exhibit severe corrosion through improper selection of materials
and poor workmanship in installation and repair. These factors along with high
system pressures, a considerable portion of the water produced is wasted through
leakage. As of present knowledge, pilot investigations and other indications,
physical water losses are assessed around 35%. Without elaboration on existing
sources of supply, some of which are as far as 170 km away and some are pumped
over a dynamic head of nearly 1.350 meters, the leaked water represents the
most immediate and least cost solution for source of supply. Potential savings
when reducing the UFW to 20% over a period of 10 years account for JD 63 million
or nearly 100 millions US$ (Fig. 1.1)
ici coller tableau de la page 4 intitulé fig. 1.1. Saving
potential ufw reduction amman
Similar to organization and management aspects of WAJ, the technical sector
also suffers from a work environment which is non - demanding and is not performance
- oriented. The majority of network is not sufficiently documented. Repair statistics,
when kept, are not analyzed as a tool for maintenance planning and for control
of the performance of repair crews.
The forecast for infrastructure development and rehabilitation costs indicates
investment needs which are rather excessive. Zoned land development for
the various categories classified according to population concentration would
cost nearly JD 128 million or about 180 million US$ (Table 1). Total rehabilitation
costs for the development areas account to nearly JD 235 million or 350 million
US$ (Table 2).
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| A
B C D |
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| Average cost per km² | ||||
| Core Area Greater Amman | ||||
| Development Areas Directly Surrounding Amman | ||||
| GRAND TOTAL 127.5 | ||||
| * based on actual construction cost price levels of 1995. | ||||
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| A
B C D + others |
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| Grand Total | ||||
| * Assumption : rehabilitation cost 75% of new infrastructure
development in C&D,
50% in A & B | ||||
REHABILITATION AND INITIAL PROCESSES
In March 1989, a study was concluded for the ''Hydraulic Analysis of the Water
System in the Greater Amman Area'', whereby 6 priority areas for rehabilitation
were identified. The project was appraised in 1990 and in 1992. Delay is attributed
due to the Gulf War and resulting political effects. In April 1993, the first
scheme (C3) was commenced from WAJ's own budget after realizing the negative
effect of its postponement. In December 1993, a limited financing agreement
was concluded. In April 1994, a design contract was awarded and by December
1994 the first rehabilitation scheme under the signed loan was tendered. The
contract, termed Contract (1A) was signed in June 1995.
This was years and 3 months after the area was identified to be in dire need
for rehabilitation. The second contract termed (1B) was signed in December 1995.
The following highlights some of the key milestones with respect to the individual
contracts.
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OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE SUPPORT (OMS) AND HYDRAULIC STUDY
An agreement was concluded in September 1993 to provide Greater Amman support
in operational and management matters, called the OMS project. The study, under
this project, detailed analysis of organization and management of the Amman
Governorate and WAJ in general. It also conducted a detailed analysis of the
technical aspects of the system supported by accompanying physical measures.
Managerially, the study confirmed the presence of a vicious cycle between organizational
set-up, management practices, staff performance and the deterioration of services
and physical assets. The investigations outlined measures and means where additional
revenues of approximately 50% in Amman operations could be achieved. The major
conclusion was the need to transform WAJ into a commercial entity outside the
control of civil service regulations.
The rapid growth of Greater Amman and the related extension and expansion
of the water supply facilities necessitated the need to update the original
hydraulic study conducted in 1986 to 1989. A Hydraulic Study was initiated in
August 1995 to be concluded in April 1997. The scope of work (expanded from
the last study) would include now all aspects of transmission of water from
the respective sources to the individual areas in the city. Main results from
this study are expected to :
3 - AVAILABLE OPTIONS
As outlined earlier, the approach that WAJ took in the past was more of the
technical nature, continuously hindered by lack of sufficient resources to take
the problem within a comprehensive long-term oriented strategy.
The problem is more acute today as it has become apparent that the following
have to be acted upon in parallel :
The total investment needs are in the order of JD 1 billion or 1,5 billion
US$ up to the year 2010 (Fig. 2.1.) These figures by far overstretch the available
financial resources.
| Measures | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 |
| 1. Water resources development & transmission
(Disi - Adasiya, Deir Alla) 2. Extension of network 3. Rehabilitation / Restructuring | |||
It is of primary importance that, WAJ has to develop an optimum strategy to
guarantee a safe water supply to Greater Amman beyond the short term horizon
of the year 2005. The following options are considered to develop such needed
strategy. These options can be materialized in various forms and modifications
depending on the urgency of addressing issues, and the political will behind
the change needed to successfully implement these options.
This option is not comprehensive in nature since it considers the prevailing
political and administrative conditions as static and rigid thus limiting radical
and efficient strategic thinking.
The focus in this option is on technical issues through progressive rehabilitation
schemes except that a higher technical quality of the water supply system has
to be introduced. This will partially compensate for the existing operational
staff and managerial problems which operate in a rigid bureaucratic structure.
The primary advantage of this option is that it is manageable with existing
staff and methods and includes very few unknown parameters. The methods have
been used before and have been proven. It may and may not address important
political parameters like tariff, redundant staff and haphazardous town development
with resulting serious financial implications.
This option will result in the need, on more urgent basis, for substantial
short-term investments in both water resource development for additional supply
of water to supply the additionally needed water and in replacing large parts
of the distribution system. It will not result in minimizing short-term investments,
nor operate on a cost - recovery basis in order to reduce operating cost-recovery
basis in order to reduce operating costs and build up capital for longer-term
investments.
OPTION 2 - INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND IMPROVED MANAGEMENT
The basic assumptions here are funding constraints but there are no limitations
on institutional reform. The option focuses on utilizing existing resources
of all types to the maximum.
New developments and costs of initial installations of the systems as the
city grows horizontally will either have to be borne by the Municipality which
is outside its legal jurisdiction or by housing societies and development entities
which can only be done under specific policy decisions. Alternatively, WAJ has
to limit piped supply (due to the limited financial resources) and only provide,
for example, major feeded points using the tanker supply system until a reasonable
population density is reached. The same applies to sewerage services with less
pools and tanker relief transporting sewager to treatment plants.
This is with respect to the technical aspects of water and wastewater services.
On the other hand, on managerial grounds, priority will be given to modernize
the organization and managerial structure of WAJ/Greater Amman in order to operate
on commercial basis. This requires, on the macro level, adaptation of the proposed
institutional restructuring of separating bulk and retail supplies and changing
the basic parameters such that the Ministry of Water & Irrigation can function
with increasing flexibility and commercial business practices. On the micro
level of individual utilities such as the WAJ of Greater Amman, a commercially
- run new water company could provide the framework for more efficient operation
and control of the water supply systems. Intermittent supply during peak periods
will remain. Services could improve immediately by :
Such restructuring of the organizational and managerial system, will input
an additional 5 - 7 million JD (total revenue for Amman is presently 12 million
JD) i.e. an increase of nearly 50%. Along with cost savings of approximately
2 million JD, up to 10 million JD can become available for restructuring and
rehabilitation the distribution systems without increasing the present budget.
Saving potential has already been illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Whereas this option provides these financial advantages and gives a higher
degree of flexibility and before decisions on substantial investments for new
supply can be made , (a grace period of up to 5 years) nevertheless, supply
problems on the medium-term horizon after year 2005 will not be solved.
OPTION 3 - OPTIMIZATION INPUTS
The assumption here is that there will be no constraints on finance or on
institutional change. This option represents an integrated comprehensive approach
and needs, by far, the most drastic changes. Through a combination of required
changes. Through a combination of required changes which include technical,
managerial and financial inputs, the overall objective to provide adequate,
good quality services to all customers can be achieved in a considerably shorter
period.
The time / cost relationship clearly indicate the need to let out management
contracts. Optimizing all inputs imply the need for a higher degree of private
sector participation to outsource functions like billing and revenue collection
leak detection and repair and so on.
Like Option 2, top priority shall be given to institutional reform, modernizing
the organization, managerial systems, and system operations to become on commercial
basis. Unlike Option 2, however, the levels of service will improve. Intermittent
supply although will remain, shall be controlled and subject to minimum criterion.
Piped water supply, however, will be provided only in areas with reasonable
population density and supply through water tankers will be an element in newly
developed areas but no longer needed in built-up areas.
The provision of adequate funding, combined with cost savings through improved
management and operations, shall result in full implementation of the planned
rehabilitation strategy, which envisages water loss reduction by :
The implementation of the rehabilitation strategy would result in the reduction
of unaccounted-for water and in the region of control over the supply and distribution
systems.
4 - SELECTION OF OPTION AND CONSTRAINTS
The following is a simplified tabulation of the assumptions for each of the
options.
Obviously a fourth option of no financial constraints simultaneously with
institutional constraints does not exist.
The following page indicates the clear economic advantages for the three options.
A brief risk analysis of the three options indicates obviously that the risk
increases as the economic advantages increase.
Option 3, appears to be the most reasonable of options but implies drastic
decisions and the need for political will.
The decisions relate to :
5 - IMPLEMENTATION
The severance of already visible symptoms of crisis, like intermittent supply,
extensive visible leakage and financial bottlenecks prompted WAJ to work of
remedial measures and start implementing part of the anticipated supply and
rehabilitation strategies :